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Abstract: The dynamic yet vulnerable nature of an hoc network presents many new security and privacy challenges.
Securing the process of service discovery is one of them. Novel solutions are therefore required. However, in
order for appropriate security measures to be devised, all possible security threats must first be identified and
thoroughly analysed. In this paper, we present a threat model for service discovery in ad hoc networks. Based
on these threats, we proceed to derive the security services required to achieve secure service discovery.
1 INTRODUCTION
An ad hoc network is formed spontaneously by a col-
lection of two or more mobile devices. These devices,
also referred to as Nodes, may communicate directly
if they are within radio range of each other, or rely on
intermediate nodes to route their messages if they are
not. Nodes may join, leave or change their existing lo-
cations, and this results in a constantly changing net-
work topology. The dynamic and infrastructureless
nature of the ad hoc network poses many interesting
problems and challenges. Service Discovery is one of
them.
One of the primary objectives of forming an ad hoc
network is for nodes to share and utilise each others’
resources. Before a resource can be used, it needs to
be located. The process of finding available resources
in an ad hoc network is known as service discovery
and research in this important area is slowly gather-
ing momentum. A variety of ad hoc network ser-
vice discovery schemes (Garcia-Macias and Torres,
2005; Mohan et al., 2004) have recently been pro-
posed, with each scheme focusing on different aspects
of service discovery, such as architectural choice (Lim
et al., 2005), service description syntax (Tyan and
Mahmoud, 2005) and other performance metrics (Gao
et al., 2006). However, none addresses the issue of
security from the outset, despite its fundamental im-
portance.
Before any novel security solutions are devised to
secure service discovery, a thorough analysis of all
possible security threats that could arise must be con-
ducted. Effective solutions can then be developed
with these threats in mind. In this paper, we focus
on the threats that arise during service discovery, and
we also analyse the threats according to the type of
misbehaviour that the nodes exhibit.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
In section 2, we define the terminology used, and sec-
tion 3 describes the different service discovery archi-
tectures. In section 4, we present the threat model. In
the penultimate section, the security requirements are
identified, and conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2 TERMINOLOGY
We begin with the definition of a service. O’Sullivan
(O’Sullivan et al., 2002) has defined a Service as: “An
action performed by an entity on behalf of another and
this action involves the transfer of value”. In the con-
text of an ad hoc network, examples of service may
include printing of documents, performing computa-
tions, data storage, image capture, etc. Against this
backdrop, Service Discovery can thus be defined as:
“The act or process of finding and locating a service
on a network”. The overall performance of a ser-
vice discovery scheme can be measured with a metric
known as Service Availability. This metric is the ra-
tio of the number of service requests made against the
number of requests that were actually fulfilled.
The entities participating in the service discovery
process are now introduced: A Service User (SU)
node is a node that seeks a particular service offered
by other nodes in the network. A Service Provider
(SP) node has one or more services to offer other
nodes. Depending on the service discovery architec-
ture employed, a Directory (SD) node may also be in-
volved in the service discovery process. An SD node
acts as a broker between the SU and SP nodes. It
maintains a list of the available services in the net-
work. Some nodes may not participate directly in
the service discovery process, but may be called upon
to forward or route the service messages between the
principal participants. We call these nodes Forward-
ing (FW) nodes. It is also possible for a node to take
on more than one role. For instance, a node may offer
a particular service (SP node) and also be a consumer
of another service (SU node).
A variety of different service messages are ex-
changed and sent between the entities during service
discovery. A Service Request (SrvReq) is a message
sent by an SU node to search for a particular service.
A Service Reply (SrvRep) is a message sent to an SU
node if the requested service is available. It can be
sent by either an SP or an SD node. A Service Adver-
tisement (SrvAdv) is a message sent (via broadcast)
by an SP node to announce its service offering. An SU
node sends an Acknowledgement (SrvAck) message
to the SP node if it is interested in the advertised ser-
vice. Service Register/Deregister (SrvReg/SrvDReg)
messages are sent by an SP node to an SD node to
register or deregister a service. In response, an Ac-
knowledgement (SrvAck) message is sent back to the
SP node. An SD node will broadcast a Directory Ad-
vertisement (DirAdv) message to announce its pres-
ence to other nodes. A Service List (SrvList) is a file
maintained by an SD node that contains a listing of
the available services.
Two other important terms, used to denote the dis-
tance (in terms of radio ranges) between two nodes,
are hop and hop count. Nodes within radio range of
each other are said to be one hop apart. Two nodes are
X hops away from each other if a minimum of X − 1
intermediate nodes are required to route a message
between them. Hop count is defined as the maximum
number of times that a particular message will be for-
warded by an intermediate node. The set of nodes
which are at most X hops away from a node is also
referred to as the scope of a node.
3 AD HOC NETWORK SERVICE
DISCOVERY ARCHITECTURES
In an ad hoc network, services may be discovered in a
number of different ways. This has an effect on how
the entities interact with each other, which in turn af-
fects the type of threats that arise during service dis-
covery. Hence, it is imperative to have a good under-
standing of the various discovery methods in order to
produce an accurate threat model.
As depicted in Figure 1, techniques for service dis-
covery in ad hoc networks can generally be classified
into three main types (Rao, 2004). They are the medi-
ated, immediate and hybrid architectures.
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Figure 1: Classification of Service Discovery Architectures.
We now examine the workings of the three archi-
tectures, based on the assumption that all the nodes
are non-malicious, co-operative and trustworthy.
3.1 Mediated Architecture
This architecture is also known as the Service Co-
Ordinator Based architecture (Toh, 2002). In this
architecture, SU and SP nodes rely on a service co-
ordinator or an SD node to facilitate service discov-
ery. As an ad hoc network is usually composed of het-
erogenous devices, the role of an SD node is usually
taken on by the more powerful devices (the method
used to select an SD node is beyond the scope of this
paper).
Assuming that an SU and an SP node are both
within the scope of an SD node, service discovery
takes place as follows:
1. The SD node periodically announces its presence
by broadcasting a DirAdv message through the net-
work (with an initial hop count of X).
2. An SP node will register its service offerings with
the SD node by sending a unicast SrvReg message
to the SD node.
3. The SD node will acknowledge receipt of an
SrvReg message by sending a SrvAck message
back to the SP node. The SD node also updates
its list (SrvList) of all registered services.
4. An SU node seeking a service will query an SD
node by sending a unicast SrvReq message to the
SD node.
5. Upon receiving a SrvReq message, an SD node
searches its SrvList for the requested service. If
the sought service is found, the SD node sends a
SrvRep message back to the SU node. The SrvRep
message will contain details of the service provider
(e.g. the URL or IP address of the service provider).
6. A registered service may be removed from the
SrvList when it expires or when an SP node sends
a SrvDrg message to the SD node.
In the event that an SD node is more than one ra-
dio hop away from SU and SP nodes, intermediate
nodes will forward the SrvReq, SrvRep, SrvReg, Sr-
vAck and SrvDrg messages to and from the SD nodes,
provided the message does not traverse more than X
hops. It should be noted that the mediated architec-
ture can be further divided into two sub-categories:
transparent and non-transparent. Transparent means
that SU and SP nodes are fully aware of the existence
of one or more SD node(s) in the network, while non-
transparent means SU and SP nodes are not aware that
an SD node is present, thinking they are interacting
directly with each other.
The mediated approach is extremely scalable but
is unsuitable for highly mobile environments, as the
SrvLists have to be constantly updated and modified.
Another shortcoming of this approach is the service
non-discoverability problem between an SU node that
is interested in the service offering of an SP node. The
two nodes may be in close proximity, but service dis-
covery simply cannot take place. This is because ei-
ther one or both of the nodes are lying outside the
scope (beyond X hops) of the SD node. In such a
case, there is no way for either node to be aware of
the presence of the other, no matter how near they are
to each other.
3.2 Immediate Architecture
The immediate architecture is also referred to as the
Distributed Query-Based Architecture (Toh, 2002). In
this architecture, there are no SD nodes. SU and SP
nodes seek and advertise their own services directly,
without relying on SD nodes.
An SU node seeks a service by broadcasting a
SrvReq message through the network (with an initial
hop count of X). Upon receiving this SrvReq mes-
sage, a node may:
• send a unicast SrvRep message to the SU node
if it offers the requested service, and forward the
SrvReq message to its neighboring nodes.
• decrement the hop count and rebroadcast the
SrvReq message if it does not offer the specified
service.
• do nothing and drop the packet if the hop count
reaches zero.
This method of discovery is sometimes known as ac-
tive or pull-based discovery. Alternatively, an SP
node may advertise its service by broadcasting a Sr-
vAdv message through the network (with an initial
hop count of X). Upon receiving a SrvAdv message,
a node may:
• send a SrvAck message to the SP node if it is in-
terested in the service offered, and rebroadcast the
SrvAdv message.
• decrement the hop count and rebroadcast the Sr-
vAdv message.
• do nothing and drop the packet if the hop count
reaches zero.
Nodes receiving a SrvAdv message may cache the
service information for future use and compile a
SrvList of their own. This method of discovery is also
referred to as passive or push-based discovery.
Finally, as shown in Figure 1, active and passive
discovery may also take place concurrently. This ar-
chitecture is suitable for highly mobile networks, but
it does not scale well.
3.3 Hybrid Architecture
The mediated and immediate architectures may co-
exist at the same time to yield the hybrid approach.
The hybrid approach offers several advantages over
a pure mediated or a pure immediate architecture.
Firstly, simulation results in (Guichal and Toh, 2001)
have shown that service availability is significantly
better with the hybrid approach. Secondly, the pres-
ence of SD nodes in the network also improves scal-
ability. Finally, the service non-discoverability prob-
lem can also be easily overcome. Service discovery
is now possible between two nodes that are in close
proximity even when one or both of the nodes are
not within the scope of the SD node. Because of
the added flexibility of the immediate approach, either
node is now capable of broadcasting a service request
or service advertisement on their own.
In summary, the hybrid approach is more flexible
and enhances service availability.
4 A Service Discovery Threat Model
There exist a variety of security issues and threats in
ad hoc networks (Mishra and Nadkarni, 2003; Pa-
padimitratos and Hass, 2003; Zhou, 2003). However,
in our threat model we focus solely on the threats that
arise during service discovery.
4.1 Objective of Service Discovery
Different entities have different aims for, and expecta-
tions of, a service discovery protocol. We briefly dis-
cuss this from the perspectives of the three main types
of entity involved, namely: Service Users, Service
Providers and Directory nodes. From a service user’s
perspective, the primary aim is to find a provider of
the desired service within its scope. It may also want
to know what other services are available in the net-
work. A service provider’s main aim is to inform all
service users of its service offerings. Finally, a direc-
tory simply wants all users and providers to be aware
of its presence so that it can perform its task.
Therefore, any action that can be performed by an
entity that prevents any of the above can be consid-
ered as a security threat, or a form of attack.
4.2 Threat Targets
Threat targets are the assets of the system. They
are the prime motivation for a potential adversary to
launch an attack. Threat targets can be broadly cate-
gorised into two types: Tangible and Intangible.
If an attack is aimed at a tangible threat target, then
the effects would be more immediately observable.
Examples of tangible threat targets include: the in-
tegrity and availability of the entities, the confidential-
ity, integrity and availability of the service messages
and SrvList, the integrity and legitimacy of the service
discovery process, and the resources or energy of the
nodes.
An attack aimed at intangible threat targets may not
have an immediately observable effect. Examples of
intangible threat targets include: network connectiv-
ity and availability, and the reputations of the entities.
4.3 The Threat Model
In an ad hoc network, where all communications take
place over the wireless medium, any device with an
appropriate network interface is capable of gaining
access to the network and participating in the network
functions it offers. Further, devices or nodes are free
to join or leave the network or even change their lo-
cations at any time. This results in an dynamic net-
work topology. Consequently, the concept of a phys-
ical perimeter does not really apply in an ad hoc net-
work.
Without a clear boundary, it is difficult to make a
distinction between internal and external nodes and
to classify the corresponding threats into internal or
external threats.
In our threat model, we therefore do not attempt to
distinguish between internal and external threats. In-
stead, we focus on the types of threat that could arise
from the various types of node misbehaviour.
A classification of service discovery security
threats is shown in Figure 2. The threats are divided
into three main categories, according to the type of
misbehaviour (Yau and Mitchell, 2003) that the nodes
exhibit. They are: Failed nodes, Selfish nodes and
Malicious nodes. Malicious nodes can be further sub-
divided into Active and Passive threats. It is helpful
to examine the threats arising from these three differ-
ent types of misbehaviour, for they have very different
characteristics.
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Figure 2: Classification of Service Discovery Threats.
We now examine the different types of threats in
greater detail and discuss their implications and con-
sequences.
4.3.1 Failed Nodes
Involuntarily, a node may be prevented from partak-
ing in the service discovery process in the normal co-
operative manner that is demanded of all nodes in an
ad hoc network. Such nodes are termed Failed Nodes
and do not harbour any malicious intent. This type of
misbehaviour is usually a consequence of either:
• A node having its resources (power) completely de-
pleted. Such a node may have been the target of
a concerted Denial of Service (DOS) attack by an
adversary. As a result of the attack, the node’s bat-
tery or power might have been completely drained,
rendering it unable to perform any task or network
function. A node’s resources could also have nat-
urally run out without being subjected to any prior
attacks. This type of failure is also known as grace-
ful failure.
• A node may also be deemed a failed node if it is
incapable of communicating with the other nodes
(within its radio range) in the network. This may
be due to a faulty network interface or the result of
an adversary jamming or interfering with the wire-
less channel. Normal operation may resume once
the adversary stops the interference. As such, node
failure could be temporary or permanent.
Even though failed nodes do not misbehave inten-
tionally, the threats they posed to the service discov-
ery process are just as devastating. Threats pose by
failed nodes vary significantly, depending on the type
of node that fails. If the failed node is:
• an FW node, it will not be able to forward any ser-
vice messages to and from any service entities (SU,
SP and SD). Service discovery will not be possible
if the particular failed FW node serves as the only
link or path between two service entities. Also,
an FW node may fail while forwarding a service
message. It will thus be unable to complete its ac-
tion and will be deemed a failed node. The conse-
quences of a failed FW node can therefore be rather
significant even though it is not a principal partici-
pant in the service discovery process.
• an SU node, it is incapable of sending and receiv-
ing any service messages to or from any other en-
tities. In other words, it is unable to take any part
in the service discovery process. However, service
discovery between other service entities is not af-
fected.
• an SP node, it will no longer be able to service
its existing service users and to solicit new ser-
vice users as it is incapable of sending any service
advertisement or registration messages to service
users or directories. Service discovery between
other service entities remains unaffected.
• an SD node, the entire service discovery system in
the network may be crippled. In a mediated only
architecture, SU and SP nodes rely on SD nodes to
facilitate service discovery. If it is the only SD node
in the network, the effects are dire. Otherwise, ser-
vice discovery may still take place normally in the
absence of an SD node, as seen in the hybrid or
immediate architectures. The effects that a failed
SD node has on the service discovery process de-
pend very much on the service discovery architec-
ture that is employed.
4.3.2 Selfish Nodes
In an ad hoc network, the success of the service dis-
covery process depends greatly on the co-operation
of all the nodes. Unfortunately, with the aim of con-
serving their scarce resources, some nodes may sim-
ply refuse to co-operate even though they are fully
capable of doing so. These nodes co-operate only
when there are incentives for them to do so. Nodes
that exhibit this type of behaviour are known as self-
ish nodes. These nodes are not malicious in nature
even though they misbehave intentionally. If a selfish
node is:
• an FW node, it selectively forwards service mes-
sages. As a result, SU, SP and SD nodes may
not receive the service messages intended for them.
Also, in order to conserve some of its processing
power, a selfish FW node may forward service mes-
sages without decrementing the hop count. Nodes
may receive an out of scope service message and
may have trouble contacting the sending node later
on. Service discovery may be severely disrupted as
a result of either action.
• an SU node, it selectively broadcasts service re-
quests. The service discovery process is not really
affected in any way. It should be noted that it is
highly unlikely that an SU node behaves in a self-
ish manner, as there is very little motivation for the
SU node to do so, and it stands to gain very little.
• an SP node, it does not broadcast its service adver-
tisements as often as it should. SU and SD nodes
will not be aware of the services offered by the SP
node. Again, there is very little incentive for an SP
node to behave in a selfish manner, as it does not
stand to gain anything.
• an SD node, it may not inform the network of its
existence. As such, SU and SP nodes will not be
able to request and register services respectively.
Hence, in a pure mediated architecture, service dis-
covery will simply be impossible. Also (regard-
less of the type of architecture employed), it may
not accept SrvReq messages from SU nodes or
SrvReg/SrvDReg messages from SP nodes. As a
result, when it does decide to be contacted by the
other nodes, it will not be in possession of an up-
dated Srvlist.
4.3.3 Malicious Nodes
Malicious nodes have no intention of participating in
the service discovery process. Their primary aim is
to disrupt the “proper” operation of the service dis-
covery process. A wide range of threats are posed by
the malicious nodes to the service discovery process.
Associated with every threat are one or more threat
targets. Using the STRIDE method (Swiderski and
Snyder, 2004), we can classify malicious node threats
into six categories, namely: Spoofing, Tampering, Re-
pudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service,
and Elevation of privilege. Threats may also be clas-
sified as Active or Passive.
The STRIDE method (Swiderski and Snyder,
2004) is now be used to identify and analyse the ser-
vice discovery threats caused by malicious nodes.
1. Spoofing. A malicious node may masquerade as
another entity during service discovery. It may
pose as:
• an FW node. Upon receiving a legitimate ser-
vice message, it may not forward the message
to other nodes. Service discovery cannot take
place if this FW node is the only link between
two nodes. The threat target would be the in-
tended recipients of the service messages.
• an SU node and broadcast a SrvReq message
through the network. An SP or SD node receiv-
ing the message may think that they are interact-
ing with a legitimate SU node. The threat target
here is the SP, SD or even an FW node.
• another legitimate SP node and offer “services”
to an unknowing SU node.
• an SD node and announce its presence to the net-
work. This malicious SD node may be nearer
(less hops away) to some of the SU or SP nodes.
They may then choose to interact with this mali-
cious SD node instead of a legitimate one that is
further away.
The threat targets are the entities to whom the ma-
licious node will be masquerading. Spoofing is an
active threat.
2. Tampering. A malicious node may capture and
then modify legitimate service messages traversing
the network in one of the following ways:
• Alteration of legitimate service messages by
changing their contents. As a result, the in-
tended recipients of the service messages will
not be presented with accurate service informa-
tion. This greatly compromises the service dis-
covery process. The direct threat targets are the
service messages, while the indirect threat tar-
gets are the intended recipients of the altered
messages.
• Deletion of legitimate service messages. The in-
tended recipients of the service messages will
not be able to receive the messages. Service
discovery will then not take place as it should.
This threat has the same effect as a selfish node
not wanting to forward SrvReq and SrvAdv mes-
sages to other nodes. In this case, the di-
rect threat target is the deleted service message,
while the indirect threat target is the intended re-
cipient of the original service message.
• Insertion of bogus service messages. A ma-
licious node may broadcast fraudulent service
messages (e.g, SrvReq, SrvAdv, or DirAdv) into
the network. Recipients of such fraudulent mas-
sages may think that they are actually interacting
with legitimate SU, SP or SD nodes. This threat
is similar to the spoofing threat discussed above.
The threat targets here are the intended recipients
of the fraudulent messages.
It is obvious that tampering is an active threat.
The worse case scenario for a tampering threat is
when an SD node is malicious. It will then be
able to modify — i.e. alter, delete, or insert — ser-
vice information pertaining to legitimate SU and
SP nodes, since it has direct access to the SrvList.
The consequence of an inaccurate SrvList is dev-
astating for the integrity of the entire service dis-
covery process. The threat target here is clearly the
SrvList, and the indirect threat targets are the ser-
vice entities that it will be interacting with.
3. Repudiation. A malicious node may later deny
having performed a certain action. For example,
a malicious SU, SP or SD node may deny having
sent a SrvReq, SrvAdv, or DirAdv message, re-
spectively. Similarly, they may also deny having
receive a specific service message. The threat tar-
get would be the entity that the malicious node was
interacting with. Repudiation is an active threat.
4. Information Disclosure. Eavesdropping is partic-
ularly simple in a setting such as an ad hoc network,
since the primary mode of communication amongst
the nodes is a wireless channel.
During the service discovery process, a mali-
cious node is capable of eavesdropping on the ser-
vice messages that are exchanged between the ser-
vice entities, or broadcast through the network by
SU or SP nodes. An inventory of services requested
and advertised can thus easily be compiled, and this
constitutes an enumeration attack. From the gath-
ered information, a malicious node may learn the
following: the type of services being requested by
SU nodes, the type of services offered by SP nodes,
which and where the SD nodes are, and the net-
work topology. Such information can be extremely
useful for the malicious node and may be used sub-
sequently: to infer or predict future service discov-
ery patterns, or as intelligence for launching sub-
sequent attacks (e.g. replaying certain messages).
The disclosure of service information may be con-
sidered a breach of the individual entities’ privacy.
The direct threat targets are therefore the ser-
vice messages, and the indirect threat targets in-
clude the privacy or even availability of the SU,
SP and SD nodes. An information disclosure threat
does not disrupt the service discovery process in
any noticeable way. Very often, the legitimate ser-
vice entities may not even be aware that such an at-
tack is taking place. That is why this type of threat
is also commonly known as a passive threat.
5. Denial of Service (DOS). This occurs when a le-
gitimate service entity is prevented from participat-
ing in the normal service discovery process because
of the actions of a malicious node. For instance,
a malicious node may mount a DOS attack on an
SP node by flooding the node with SrvReq mes-
sages. The SP node may be overwhelmed by these
messages and hence be unable to accept legitimate
SrvReq messages from other nodes. A competitor
SP node may have strong motivation to launch such
an attack. An SU node may also be the target of a
DOS attack, even though the effects it has on the
service discovery process are not as significant.
A DOS attack could also be launched by flood-
ing an SD node with illegitimate SrvReg and
SrvReq messages. The effects of this attack could
be deadly, as the entire service discovery process of
the network could be crippled.
Nodes may fail as a consequence of a DOS at-
tack. The direct threat target would be the avail-
ability of the service entities that were subjected to
the DOS attacks, while the indirect threat targets
would be their respective reputations. DOS is an
active threat.
6. Elevation of Privileges. This happens when a ma-
licious node, by some illegitimate means, is able
to gain more privileges than it currently has (Goll-
mann, 2005). This threat normally takes place in
conjunction with the spoofing threat. When a mali-
cious node is able to masquerade as another entity
(e.g. an SU, SP, SD or FW node), it assumes the
privileges and capabilities of that entity.
It should be noted that the aforementioned threats
rarely occur in isolation. More often than not, one
threat may lead to another, as they are inter-related.
5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
If the threats are not properly mitigated, they could
be exploited by malicious nodes to launch a variety
of attacks. Countermeasures are therefore essential to
prevent the threats from being realised. The security
services required to mitigate the threats are identified
and presented below.
Authentication. One of the most important require-
ments is the mutual authentication of SU and SP
nodes (in the immediate architecture) or SD and
SU/SP nodes (in the mediated architecture). Mutual
authentication will provide two interacting service en-
tities with the assurance that they are indeed inter-
acting with the intended parties. A rogue node may
fraudulently request for/advertise a service. It may be
difficult or impossible to prevent a rogue node from so
doing, especially in immediate architectures, but an
SU or SP node may decide not to use/provide the ser-
vice if the authentication outcome is unsatisfactory.
Unilateral authentication will not suffice in this sort
of peer to peer environment, as it is equally likely for
either an SU or SP node to be malicious. This secu-
rity service aims to address the threats of spoofing and
elevation of privileges.
Authorisation. An SU node may discover a number
of available services in the network, but may only be
allowed to use some of them, depending on the secu-
rity policy specified by the SP nodes. Alternatively, a
service may not even be discoverable by an SU node
if it is unauthorised to use it. In other words, SU nodes
may only have a controlled visibility of the available
services, based on their credentials or some security
policy. Similarly, only authorised SP nodes may be
allowed to advertise their service offerings. Options
for achieving authorisation include the use of capabil-
ities, access control list and credentials. This security
service does not directly mitigate any of the afore-
mentioned threats. Nonetheless, it is important in the
context of service discovery.
Confidentiality. A variety of service messages tra-
verse the network during service discovery. A mali-
cious node can easily intercept or eavesdrop on these
messages and obtain the following information: the
identities of the senders and intended recipients, the
specific services that are being requested or advertised
by an SU or SP node, the physical location of the ser-
vice entities, etc. An SU (or even an SP) node may
not want such information to be disclosed to other en-
tities (malicious or not), apart from a legitimate SD
node. It is therefore necessary to encrypt such mes-
sages to prevent the threat of information disclosure
and to protect the privacy of service entities.
Integrity. Service messages, exchanged during ser-
vice discovery, should not be modified (i.e. altered,
deleted, inserted, or replayed). A secure service dis-
covery protocol should provide this assurance to all
service entities participating in the service discovery
process. This security service addresses the tamper-
ing threat.
Non-repudiation. Mechanisms (e.g. digital signa-
tures) should be in place to prevent any service en-
tity from later denying that a certain action has taken
place. For example, service entities should not be able
to later deny that a particular service message was
sent or received, if that action had indeed taken place.
This security service addresses the threat of repudia-
tion.
Accountability. A log that records all the events
should be available. In the event of any dispute, a neu-
tral adjudicator is able to refer to the log and make an
impartial and accurate judgement. This requirement
is closely related to the non-repudiation service, in the
sense that it may be used to deter potential repudiation
threats.
Availability. Malicious nodes should be prevented
from flooding (e.g. using broadcast) the network with
bogus service messages. A high volume of such mes-
sages could create a broadcast storm (Tseng et al.,
2002) in the network. The resources of legitimate
nodes may be depleted in an attempt to process such
messages. The entire service discovery process could
be crippled as a result. Instead of targeting the net-
work, malicious nodes may also target individual
nodes and flood them with messages. Appropriate
measures are therefore required to thwart the denial
of service threat.
Privacy. This requirement is closely related to the
confidentiality service. Privacy may mean different
things in different contexts; in the context of service
discovery for ad hoc networks, protecting the privacy
of the service entities means the following. Firstly,
service information should not be divulged to exter-
nal service entities that are not directly participating
in the service discovery process. Secondly, the iden-
tities of service entities should not be disclosed un-
necessarily without the owner’s permission. Thirdly,
the physical location information of the service enti-
ties should not be revealed. Finally, colluding SP or
SD nodes should not be able to correlate a particular
SU node’s actions. Like the confidentiality service,
this service mitigates the effects of the information
disclosure threat.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a threat model in the
context of which potential service discovery threats
were identified and analysed according to the differ-
ent types of node misbehaviour. We proceeded to de-
rive the security services that are required to mitigate
the identified threats. This work will provide a basis
for the design of secure service discovery schemes.
We believe that the two most important security re-
quirements that need to be addressed are mutual au-
thentication followed by authorisation. Existing solu-
tions for mutual authentication are not well suited for
an environment such as an ad hoc network, as there
is no central authority. Supporting mutual authenti-
cation between two interacting service entities is very
challenging in such circumstances. The need to au-
thenticate a specific identity may not be necessary if
one entity is able to prove to the other that it is a trust-
worthy service provider or user.
Similarly, achieving authorisation in this sort of dy-
namic and peer to peer environment is particularly
challenging for several reasons. Firstly, a central ad-
ministrator does not exist to pre-specify a security
policy. Secondly, service entities may belong to dif-
ferent administrative domains. Finally, authorisation
can only take place after two service entities are mutu-
ally authenticated, which is still an unsolved problem.
Fortunately, research on these authorisation problems
has been conducted under the auspices of Trust Nego-
tiation.
The dynamism of ad hoc networks has introduce
many new and interesting security problems that call
for new solutions.
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